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Introduction
As a matter of common observation, it seems that some power of discretion is usually enjoyed by those who apply rules in our legal and other rule-based systems.
Adjudicators typically enjoy a measure of discretion when considering what conduct will be allowed in litigation or what decision is appropriate. Likewise, when police officers consider whether to issue tickets to drivers, supervisors contemplate whether to promote employees, or college admissions officers determine whether to accept applicants, their decisions are to an extent theirs to make even though they operate against a background of rules.
In this article discretion is examined as a feature of the design of rule-guided systems. That is, given that rules have to be administered by some group of persons, called adjudicators, and given that their goals may be different from society's (or a relevant organization's), 1 when is it socially desirable to allocate discretionary authority to the adjudicators and, when so, to what extent?
In section 2, I consider a simple model of the application of rules by adjudicators in which discretion can be examined. In this model, a rule can depend only on certain included variables but not on unincluded variables. Granting discretion to adjudicators permits them to make decisions that reflect the unincluded variables (such as the degree of remorse shown by a criminal defendant, or the personal qualities displayed by a 1 On the motivations of adjudicators, see Richard A. Posner, What Do Judges and Justices Maximize? (The Same Thing Everybody Else Does) 3 Supreme Court Economic Review 1 (1993) , and section 3.1 of the survey, Lewis Kornhauser, Judicial Organization and Administration in 5 Encyclopedia of Law and Economic (2000) . college applicant in an interview), because adjudicators are assumed to be able to observe these variables. If it would be socially desirable for decisions to depend upon the information bound up in the unincluded variables, giving discretion to adjudicators may be beneficial. The disadvantage of permitting discretion concerns discretionary deviation, that adjudicators may not use the information in the unincluded variables to make decisions as society would want but rather to further their own objectives (a judge might favor more lenient punishment than does society, a college admissions officer might favor demonstrated poise in the interview more than the college does). Discretion is desirable to accord to adjudicators when this disadvantage is outweighed by the foregoing informational advantage.
It should be remarked that the source of the potential advantage of allowing discretion is that some variables are not included in rules but are observed by adjudicators. There are two justifications for this assumption. One is simply that certain variables would be difficult for a higher authority to verify (for example, the demeanor of a criminal defendant). The other is that the framers of a rule (such as a legislative body) may have found it impractical to spell out how a (perhaps verifiable) variable ought to affect decisions (for example, whether a rule prohibiting use of moving vehicles in a park is meant to apply to electric-powered bicycles).
In section 3, I ask how discretion can be controlled by means of restricting its scope, that is, by constraining the set of decisions that adjudicators are permitted to make.
(For instance, the sentence for a crime could be required to lie in the range between one and five years.) Limiting the scope of discretion may be useful because it prevents substantial discretionary deviation (a sentence of less than one year or more than five years), and it is shown, among other things, that a positive scope of discretion is desirable to grant under quite general conditions. Still, restricting the scope of discretion is a relatively blunt method of control because, by definition, it has no effect on deviation within the allowed scope of decisions (sentences between one and five years) and also because the exercise of discretion outside the permitted bounds would sometimes be desirable.
In section 4, I consider another way of controlling discretion, through a decisionbased incentive, namely, a scheme for rewarding or penalizing adjudicators that is based on their decisions. (For example, adjudicators could be given enhanced promotion possibilities for imposing lower sentences.) Decision-based incentives can counter discretionary deviation in a broader and more nuanced way than limiting the scope of discretion, since decision-based incentives may influence the entire range of decisions (they can be designed to lead adjudicators to affect all sentences, whereas limiting the scope of discretion only affects sentences by ruling out a class of sentences). It is demonstrated that discretion is always optimal to grant when decision-based incentives can be employed, given the assumptions of the model. However, use of decision-based incentives cannot generally eliminate the problem of discretionary deviation because decision-based incentives do not depend on the unincluded variables.
In section 5, I analyze the implicit control of discretion through the appeals process, whereby a disappointed litigant can ask a higher authority to reconsider the adjudicator's decision. Because the adjudicator can anticipate that a decision that deviates from the socially appropriate one would be appealed if the deviation is large enough to outweigh the cost of an appeal, the adjudicator will be led to keep his deviations below the point at which appeals would be provoked. Thus, the appeals process induces decisions to conform to the socially desirable, at least within the range governed by the cost of an appeal.
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In section 6, I make several concluding comments.
Prior legal literature on the discretion of adjudicators is extensive and reflects the theme of this article, that granting discretion involves a compromise between allowing adjudicators to make use of information that they have yet that also permits them to deviate from what society would want. 3 In the law and economics literature, a number of articles have dealt with the discretion of adjudicators in particular contexts, but have not addressed the general issue studied here. 4 In regard to the economics literature, the subject of the discretion of adjudicators may be viewed as a kind of principal and agent or delegation problem (since society can be regarded as a principal and an adjudicator as an agent).
5 Review 713 (1988) considers the discretion of prosecutors in making plea bargains, assuming that prosecutors have the same utility function as society. Even though prosecutors share the social objective, she finds that restricting their discretion may be beneficial because, in effect, it allows them to make binding commitments in bargaining with defendants. Jennifer F. Reinganum, Sentencing Guidelines, Judicial Discretion, and Plea Bargaining, 31 Rand Journal of Economics 62 (2000) also concludes that restricting judicial discretion may be desirable, for related reasons. Matthew Spitzer and Eric Talley, Judicial Auditing, 24 Journal of Legal Studies 649 (2000) , and Andrew F. Daughety and Jennifer F. Reinganum, Speaking Up: A Model of Judicial Dissent and Discretionary Review (2004) focus on the exercise of discretion by appeals courts over whether to review lower court decisions, in other words, on a very different issue (that of policing the lower courts) from that of concern here. 5 In the general principal and agent literature (see, for example, John Pratt and Richard Zeckhauser, Principals and Agents: The Structure of Business (1991) ) it is usually assumed that the principal observes his own payoff, whereas here it is assumed that the principal, society, cannot observe its payoff (for instance, the social consequences of sentencing a person to a term of imprisonment); see
Basic Analysis
Assume that there are two parties, the state and an adjudicator. The adjudicator has the task of making a decision. The state's welfare, social welfare, depends on the decision that the adjudicator makes and on the two variables, an included variable (such as whether a defendant stole a car) and an unincluded variable (such as his demeanor).
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The adjudicator's utility also depends on the decision and on the two variables. 7 The adjudicator observes both variables. The state observes the adjudicator's decision and the included variable but not the unincluded variable. However, the included variable will be suppressed in the notation, for the analysis below is conditional on the value of the included variable (see note 11). Define the following: Assume here that the state chooses between two policies: either it does not allow discretion and employs a rule prescribing a decision that the adjudicator must make; or it allows the adjudicator discretion, permitting him to choose d.
If the state uses a rule to prescribe a decision, it will choose d to maximize
If the state allows discretion, the adjudicator will select d(y), so that social welfare will be
Giving adjudicators discretion is superior to not doing so if and only if (2) is greater than or equal to (1) 
This condition is equivalent to
The left side of (4) measures the loss from first-best social welfare due to discretionary
The right side measures the loss from first-best welfare due to inflexibility deviation -that d* is a constant and thus differs from d*(y).
The two types of deviation are illustrated in Figure 1 . Inequality (4) thus states that discretion is best to allow when the expected loss due to discretionary deviation is less than that due to inflexibility deviation. 11 In summary, we have 11 If the included variable, say x, were not suppressed in the notation, then (4) would be written
and the question whether or not to allow discretion would depend on the observed value of x. PROPOSITION 1. Discretion is desirable to permit when (4) holds, that is, when the expected social welfare loss due to discretionary deviation is less than or equal to that due to inflexibility deviation.// It follows that a sufficient condition for discretion to be desirable is that the expected loss from discretionary deviation is small enough, for the right side of (4) is positive. (Hence, a sufficient condition for discretion to be desirable is that the adjudicator's utility function is everywhere within some distance of w.) It also follows that a sufficient condition for discretion to be undesirable is that discretionary deviation is positive at a point y o and that the probability that y is close to y o is sufficiently high, for then prescribing d*(y o ) would be superior to allowing discretion.
12 It also is clear that discretion must be undesirable if, contrary to our assumption, d(y) is declining in y. 
Scope of Discretion
It was assumed above that when discretion is given to adjudicators, they can choose any decision, but more generally they could be given the right to choose a decision only within a set of possible decisions, called the scope of discretion. Here it is assumed that the scope of discretion is an interval [a, b] , where a # b. 14 Note that one possibility is that a = b, in which case the adjudicator has no discretion; if a < b, the adjudicator is said to have positive discretion. 
Let [a*, b*] be the optimal scope of discretion, corresponding to the a and b that maximize (5). The following result, which is shown in the appendix, describes the optimal scope of discretion. 
Decision-based Incentives.
Another means of controlling adjudicator's decision is to give him a payoff based on his decision -a decision-based incentive; let 
(y, d) + r(d) rather than to maximize u(y, d).
It should be observed that, because the function r is arbitrary, and can be discontinuous, a possible r is one which would impose a "penalty" if the decision d is outside an interval, where the penalty is large enough so that the adjudicator would never , the first-best outcome will be achieved.)
Appeals Process
Another method of controlling the exercise of discretion is to employ the appeals process, whereby disappointed litigants are given the right to have a higher authority examine the adjudicator's decision. To investigate this, assume that adjudicators enjoy full discretion and that a litigant can make an appeal at a cost. Let The adjudicator is assumed to know k and the litigants' utility functions, so the adjudicator can calculate when appeals would be made. The adjudicator will not choose a decision d that would result in an appeal: if an appeal occurs, the adjudicator's utility will be u(y, d*(y)) -s; if the adjudicator were to choose d*(y) (so that an appeal would not occur), his utility would be u(y, d*(y)); hence the adjudicator must be better off not provoking appeal than if he provokes appeal.
Since the adjudicator will choose d to maximize his utility within the range of decisions that would not lead to appeal, [d*(y) -k, d*(y) + k], his optimal decision is as information that appeals courts do not examine (presumably because of the cost that would entail); appeals courts do not conduct new trials (although they sometimes order a rough equivalent, when they remand a case to a trial court for rehearing).
follows. If his unconstrained decision d(y) is within this interval, he will obviously years on a particular defendant or on the consequences for a college of having failed to admit a particular applicant. The justification for this assumption is that it would be difficult for society or for an organization to trace out the consequences of an adjudicator's decision in a particular case. 19 This assumption was important, for if the social payoff could be observed, then the adjudicator could be better motivated (and the first-best outcome might be achievable in the model studied).
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(b) It was also implicitly assumed that the adjudicator did not need to be guaranteed a certain level of expected utility to be willing to carry out his role. If this simplifying assumption were not made and it had been supposed that that the adjudicator's expected utility must equal a reservation level for him to participate in his activity, then discretion would be desirable more often than was true in the analysis. The reason is that giving discretion to an adjudicator raises his expected utility, so permits his wage to be lowered. This wage reduction is thus a benefit of granting discretion in addition to the possible benefit from improved decisions.
(c) Consider the situation when the reason for a variable not being included in a rule is not that it is unverifiable by society, but rather that it is impractically costly for the framers of the rule to provide specifically for many possible outcomes. Recall the example of a rule prohibiting moving vehicles from a park and the question whether an electric-powered bicycle is meant to be covered; this issue might well not have been covered in the rule, even though whether a person used an electric-powered bicycle is quite plausibly verifiable. In such cases, it would make sense for, and we often observe, the use of "standards", meaning principles that adjudicators are supposed to employ as guides in decisionmaking, even though the principles are not precise. For instance, the standard might be that moving vehicles are not supposed to present an "unreasonable danger" to pedestrians in the park. (This standard might help the adjudicator to decide whether or not the electric-powered bicycle should be barred from the park, and it would rather clearly allow him to decide that a battery-powered three-inch model car could be used in the park). A standard appears to be an economical way for framers of a rule to 
